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Introduction 
Possibly recognizing that meat-count and shell-size 
restrictions have not controlled mortality in a particular 
manner, the New England Fisheries Management Council 
(NEFMC> has begun to explore alternative forms of regula-
tions. In particular, restrictions on effort are being 
considered. Effort restrictions, however, while having 
advantages over meat-count and shell-size limitations, also 
have several problems. This is particularly true if age at 
capture and equity are of concern. 
ln this note, a preliminary overview of the use of 
effort restrict ions is preser1ted. 
tionally defined, is considered. 
nition are subsequently discussed. 
The concept, as tradi-
Problems with the defi-
Next, a preliminary 
analysis of changes in landings resulting from effort res-
trict ions oY, New England sea seal lop dredge vessels is 
presented. Last, problems of imposing effort restrictions 
on a fleet comprised of heterogeneous firms are discussed. 
The Concepts of Effort and Effort Restrictions 
Effort may be defined as nominal, standardized, or 
effective. Nominal effort is a measure of fishing time or 
number of operating units (e.g., days-at-sea or fished or 
number of drags or trips made) (Treschev, 197S>. Standar-
dized effort is measured as the product of fishing power, 
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adjusted to a reference level, and fishing time or nominal 
effort; all measurements are expressed in terms of the same 
unit of measurement or base value. The purpose of stan-
dardizatio~ is to express effort over different types or 
sizes of operating units in terms of the same unit of 
measurement. Eff"ective 'Fishing eff"ort is the percent ot· 
the mean population that is caught (Cunningham and Whit-
marsh, 1980). 
Thus, effort is a measure of the combination of all 
-Factors or activities by man which influence catch. That 
is, effort is a composite input (this is the same as adding 
or grouping together steak cod, market cod, cod scrod, and 
whale cod to simply cod). Consider, for example, a fishing 
-Firm which uses f"uel, labor, electror-,ics, ice, food, gear, 
machinery, and equipment to harvest and land fish. A 
measure of et·r·ort which al lows ror al 1 these factors 
requires standardization to allow for the differences. The 
standardized measure of" of" all the listed t·actors requires 
combining all the factors into a single composite measure 
of ef"fc,rt. 
Kirkley and Strand (1988a, 1988b) and Squires (1987) 
have demonstrated, however, that it may r-,ot be possible to 
consider the influence of all factors in terms of a single 
measure. This does not rule out the possibility of using 
nominal effort or days at sea to analyze the effects of 
changes in catch resulting from changes in r-,ominal effort. 
It does, though, require consideration of all factors in 
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any analysis. 
In mathematical terms, the measure of effort as a 
composite input is specified as 
(1) Effort= g(fuel, labor, electronics, ice, food, etc.> 
This specif'ication of' effort requires that decisions about 
fuel, labor, electronics, ice, food, machinery, gear, 
and equipment be unrelated to the expected level of catch 
and the size of the fish stock. In addition, it is neces-
sary that effort double if all inputs <e.g., fuel and 
labor) double. These conditions rarely apply to fishing 
firms <e.g., we typically observe an increase in the crew 
size when the fish stock or output price is very high). 
Ef'fort. restrictions: 
A major purpose of regulating effort is to control 
f'ishing mortality (i.e., the biomass or number o'f fish 
extracted by fishing expressed as a proportion of the mean 
population size). Ef'fort restrict ior,s car, be either active 
(direct> or passive (indirect> (Sissenwine and Kirkley, 
1 '982). Active cor-,trols directly control the level of 
effort (e.g., a restriction on days-at-sea>. Passive con-
trols affect or restrict the components of effort (e.g., 
type and size of gear and fishing practices>. 
In simple terms, ef'fort restrictions are intended to 
reduce catch. Fishing mortality, in turn, should decrease. 
Overtime, the fish stock <numbers and/or biomass> should 
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increase. This is hypothesized to result in improved 
recruitment <number of fish or biomass added to the 
exploitable stock) and stock size in the future. 
Unfortunately, the link between current levels of 
fishing and future stocks sizes is extremely difficult to 
determine. About all that can be shown is that a reduction 
in the rate of removal to very low levels will likely cause 
an increase in the size of future stocks, or a very large 
rate of removal will likely result,. in depressed fish 
stocks. The eft·ects of control I iY,g mortality or the rate 
of removal between the extremes is often uncertain. 
Consider the following simplified example of how 
effort restrictions are intended to work. Let there be a 
catch-effort equation which explains how catch responds to 
changes in fishing effort: 
(2) C = q E N 
where C is catch, q is a catchability coefficient, Eis 
days at sea, and N is stock size. As effort <E> is 
restricted, catch should fall if stock size and q is held 
constant. Also, q E or F (fishing mortality> declines. As 
a result, the existing biomass and spawning stock size 
should increase in the future. The expected net result is 
an increased exploitable fish stock and biomass in the 
future: 
<a> E decreases causing C to fall 
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(b) C decreases causing N to rise 
<c> Nt increases causing Nt., to rise 
(d) N •• , increases causing c •• , to rise 
where t and t+i represent the current and future time 
periods. The bottom line is that Et decreases and Ct+t 
increases. 
It appears simple and obvious. Yet, it may not 
work. If it does work, what happens along the way? The 
economic benefits or today are being traded ror hopefull 
increased economic benerits tomorrow. That is, the fish-
erman pays today for a product believed to be available 
tomorrow. However, the product may not be available. 
Also, since most fleets are comprised of different size 
vessels, it is quite possible that some vessels must pay 
more dearly for future products. 
A Preliminary Analysis of Effort Restrictions 
In this section, a preliminary analysis of control-
ling nominal effort in the New England, sea scallop, dredge 
fishery is presented. The analysis is based on data 
available from the Northeast Fisheries Center, National 
Marine Fisheries Service. First, an industry catch-effort 
model is specified and estimated. Then, catch-effort mod-
els for three vessel size groups are estimated, and their 
results are compared to those obtained from the industry 
analysis. 
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fishing more days>. 
The resultant estimate of the catch-effort model 
based on data for 1968-1985 is: 
(5) Ct= 111.27 Eff"ort· 57 t-·''Ct-,'·'°Ct-a-· 7 " 
where effort is the composite input obtained in equation 
(4), tis time, and Ct-, and Ct-a are catches in the two 
preceding years. A positive coefficient implies that catch 
will increase as the value of the associated variable in 
increased and the values of all other variables are held 
constant; a negative coefficient implies that catch will 
decrease as the value of the associated variable increase. 
Consider restricting total days-at-sea from the 1985 
level of 17,837 days to the 1978 level of 9 7 927 days. The 
corresponding total effort decreases from 238.37 to 187.32 
standardized days; catch declines from 357 812 metric tons 
of whole scallops to 30,612 tons or 14.5 p~rcent. However, 
the same level of standardized effort can be maintained by 
substituting or augmenting labor for days; the required 
rate of increase is approximately one man per boat (i.e., 
going from an average crew size of 9 to 10 men per vessel). 
Subfleet analysis: 
Unfortunately, an effort restriction across the 
fleet ignores the potential impacts and different responses 
by individual vessels of different characteristics (Kar-
poff, 1987). That is, if a fleet is comprised of vessels 
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with different characteristics (e.g., vessel size>, the 
effects of a uniform restriction will likely vary across 
vessels. This is illustrated by considering three vessel 
classes in which effort restrictions are uniformly imposed. 
The three classes are based on size: <1> 5-50 GRT, (2) 
51-150 GRT, and (3) 151 + GRT. 
In the preceding analysis, effort was restricted to 
its 1978 level of 9,927 days-at-sea. This works out to a 
uniform restrictions of 59.09 days-at-sea per vessel. In 
comparision, the number of days-at-sea per boat in 1985, 
without restrictions, was 106.17 days. Holding the number 
of vessels and tonnage constant and applying the 59.09 days 
to each vessel in the three size classes yields the follow-
ing total levels of effort with restrictions: (1) 5-50 
GRT--1181.79, (2) 51-150 GRT--3722.63, and (3) 151 + GRl-
-5022.59 days-at sea. The unrestricted number of days-at-
sea during 1985 for the three tonnage classes were 423, 
4891, and 12523 days, respectively. It is immediately evi-
dent that the small boat fleet will not be restricted by 
the effort restrictions while the large boat fleet will 
have effort reduced by more than SO-percent. In fact, the 
small boat fleet will not experience any restrictions until 
total days are restricted to less than 3,553 days or 21 
days per vessel given uniform restrictions in terms of 
days per boat. 
Similar to the industry analysis, it was determined 
that composite inputs could be formed for the three vessel 
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classes: 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
5-50: 
51-150: 
161 +: 
Ee = De l • s • < Ve GRT e > - • 15 • 
Ee = Le :a· ••De· s 4 <Ve GRTe > - :a· 4 l 
Ee = Le a . :a tS De . a 11 <Ve GRT e ) - l • • 4 
The two larger vessel classes can increase labor to offset 
restrictions on days-at sea; the smaller vessels caY,not 
augment other factors to maintain the same level of effort. 
Given the restrictions of 3722.63 and 5022.59 days 
for the two larger vessel classes, the same level of effort 
caY, be achieved by increasing labor for 9 to 10 and 10 to 
11 men per boat, respectively. Alternatively, a one-
percent restrict ion or, the ur-,restricted 1 '985 levels o'f days 
at sea will reduce the composite level of effort by 1.56, 
.54, and .2'3 percent, respectively, for the srnall, ri-1edium, 
and large boat fleets. This means that the same level of 
e'f'fort before the restrictions can be obained by increasing 
labor; this will enable the two larger vessel classes to 
harvest the same level o'f catch realized be'fore the 
restrictions. As will be subsequently shown, it is also 
possible 'for the small boat fleet to substitute labor to 
maintain the same level of catch; however, they cannot 
maintain the same level o'f e'ffort. 
More important, though, is how will total catch 
respond to the three dif'ferent levels of effort. The cor-
responding estimated catch-effort models are as follows: 
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(9) 5-50: C, = .000000006LT· 69 E,'· 0 •t~-~ 0 c,_,. ''C,-a· 0 ' 
( 10) 51-150: C, = 493906E, • 6 • t-' · 7 • C, - 1 '· "'~ C, - a - • 9 11 
(11) 151 +: C, = 8. 24Et · 6 9 t· 911 Ct - , '· •"' C, - a - '· 0 "' 
<Note that a restriction on days cannot be circumvented 
with respect to effort for the small boat fleet, but can be 
circumvented with respect to catch. That is, if the days-
at-sea restriction is binding for the small boat fleet, 
they cannot increase labor to maintain the same level of 
effort, but they can increase labor to maintain the same 
level of catch>. 
Given no substitution to offset the restriction on 
days, total catch for each t·leet is estimated to decrease 
by O (5-50), 8.8 (51-150), and 16.77 (151 +) percent. 
Thus, the effort restrictior-, more severely affects the 
large boat fleet given no substitution. 
The difrerent effects of· restricting days at sea can 
also be illustrated by examining the respective output 
elasticities or the percentage change in output resulting 
from a one-percent decrease ir-, the existing levels of days 
at sea. Based on the industry specification, a one-percent 
decrease in the number of days, given no substitution and 
all other factors held constant, will result in a 
.23-percent decline in catch (table 1). ln comparision, a 
or-,e-percent decrease in days-at-sea wi 11 cause output to 
decline 1.66, .34, and .2 percent for the small, medium, 
and large boat fleet (table 1>. These declines are based 
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on the condition that days at sea are restricted to less 
than their observed levels by one-percent. 
Table 1. Estimated percentage change in catch for a 
one-percent reduct ion i r, days-at-sea, 1985 
Days at sea 
Fleet size 
Restrictions 
Number of 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
. 
. 
Catch 1 
Restrictions 
vessels None 1-~ drop: None 1-~ Days ~-change 
: 
5-50 423 419 560 551 -1.66 
20 
51-150 4891 4842 9072 '9041 -.34 
63 
151 + 1252.3 12397 26180 26128 -. 20 
85 
Total 17837 17659 35812 .357 .30" -.23 
168 
1 Metric ton weight--whole scallops. 
•Based on aggregate model; not sum of three models. 
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Problems of Imposing Effort Restrictions 
The preceding analysis indicates that effort 
restrictions imposed on a fleet with different character-
istics will have different impacts on various groups of 
vessels. First, it is possible for a group of vessels to 
not be affected by the restrictions if a t·leet restriction 
is uniformly applied to all vessels. Second, an across the 
board restriction on effort will impose a different level 
of burden for each vessel with different characteristics; 
smaller vessels are typically more adversely affected by 
these types of restrictions in which effort is uniformly 
restricted from its current levels for each vessel class. 
Thus, a major problem of imposing effort restric-
tions is uHow can they be fairly and equitably imposed?" 
The answer depends upon how fair is equitable is defined. 
This could be in terms of profit, revenue, costs, or access 
to the fish stocks. Economics would consider profitabil-
ity, net benefits, and economic efficiency. 
Another preblem is that of factor substitution. 
That is, all three tonnage classes can mitigate the 
restrictive nature of days-at-sea restrictions by substi-
tuting labor. Alternatively, other factors such as elec-
tronics and machinery which were not considered in the 
example may be substituted. For example, the size of a 
dredge may be increased or the ring size decreased. lt may 
be possible to increase the towing speed (fuel for days). 
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On-board capital or equipment may be increased. The actual 
substitution will depend upon the expected changes in 
revenues and costs from substitution. 
Third, restrictions on days-at-sea are not the only 
form of effort restrictions and they may not adequately 
control mortality on juvenil scallops. It may be necessary 
to consider restrictions on days-at-sea, gear, area, and 
time of year (i.e, passive controls}. 
Last, overall effort restrictions may required 
additional limitations on the number and size of vessels. 
If eY,try is possible, it may be necessary to continuously 
adjust the effort restriction in response to possible 
increased overall effort. Alternatively, some vessels may 
be forced out of the fishery if new vessels are more 
efficient than the existing vessels. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The eventual objective of effort restrictions is to 
maintain or enhance the level of the exploitable fish 
stock. In simple terms, the present level of effort is 
restricted to either allow future stocks to be constant or 
to increase in size with respect to the present size of the 
fish stock. Active or direct restrictions, however, may 
fail to adequately control the age of capture, a major con-
cern for the scallop fishery, unless accompanyiy,g passive, 
spatial, and/or temporal restrictions are also imposed. 
Moreover, implementation of effort restrictions may require 
-13-
additional consideration oF diFferent classes of Fishing 
vessels if equity is of' coy,cern. Last, restrictions 
restrictions on components of effort may require restric-
t ions on other f·actors used to harvest fish if factor sub-
stitution is possible. 
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